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Abstract
Thorough U.S. and E.U sanctions that ban the export of goods and services to Iran remain 
largely obsolete in recognizing how communications can benefit both the civilian population and 
serve broader Western States foreign policy goals against the mentioned state. Recent sanction 
against more than 20 TV and radio channels was indeed just an attempt by the West against 
Iranian media. It was a flagrant violation of freedom of speech and in contrast to the free flow 
of information by satellite providers as Eutelsat SA and Intelsat SA which stopped the broadcast 
of several Iranian satellite channels in October 2012. Because of the International recognition 
of dignity, equality and autonomy of all people that led to formulation of fundamental rights, 
particularly with regard to freedom of expression and access to information and by correlation 
existed between the right to express and freedom of all kinds of mass media; in this article we 
would examine the case of recent sanctions against Iran. It seems clear that the sanctions are 
both the violation of the human rights values and also contrary to the fundamental principles of 
democracy, International Co-operations and in contrast with object and purpose of International 
Telecommunication Union.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of sanctions against Iran dates back to the post-1979 
Revolution in Iran.1 Starting as restrictions on the import of Iranian oil 
into the United States (US) and later developed into the banning of all 
imports of Iranian refined and non-oil products, and it expanded by an 
embargo of US exports in the 1980s which all seems to be against the 
nature of the treaty of amity between two states.2 At the time, it seems 
that U.S. sanctions have been a major characteristic of U.S. Iran policy 
1 See John Mueller and Karl Mueller. «Sanctions of Mass Destruction.» Foreign Af-
fairs. : 154-157. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049344 (18/11/2013).
2 See Shahbazi Aramesh, «Some Considerations Regarding the Use of Treaty of Am-
ity between Iran and the U.S», International Law Review, 2010, pp.55-71.
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since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Thus U.N. and worldwide bilateral 
sanctions on Iran are a relatively recent (post-2006) development. Many 
of the U.S. sanctions enhance U.N. and multilateral sanctions in recent 
years by European and some of Asian countries. The goals of U.S. 
sanctions have evolved over time. It seems that in the mid-1980s, U.S. 
sanctions were planned to try to persuade Iran to stop supporting acts of 
terrorism and to limit Iran’s authority in the Middle East. But since the 
mid-1990s, U.S. sanctions have generally focused on persuading Iran 
to limit its nuclear program. Particularly since 2010, the international 
community specially the European unity has been added to U.S. 
sanctions in the way of this goal. During Clinton’s presidential time, 
by passing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, depicted that any investment 
in Iran’s energy sector was strictly prohibited for more than twenty 
million dollar. Further sanctions, including Iran’s Central Bank and 
Tejarat Bank, have tried to cut Iran off the global financial system and 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT). As a result, oil customers can’t transfer money to Iran in 
American dollars or export products as exchange for oil. 
However while many believe that the sanctions on one hand have 
contributed to increasing inflation and on the other hand have also 
played a significant role in the negotiations between the Security 
Council and Iran over its nuclear program and uranium enrichment3, 
Iran has repeatedly affirmed the inefficacity of the sanctions against 
Iran and rejected this scenario. 
We can speak more about the sanctions but despite the central role 
the media plays in the domestic and foreign policy-making processes, 
very few research examines the influence of international factors such 
as restrictions on international transactions on media freedom and the 
free flow of information. In this research we will analyze the sanctions 
against the right of Iran to freedom of mass media and violation of the 
access of Iranian to free flow of information. Therefore by taking a 
brief look at the specific sanctions of the U.S and European Union, as a 
coercive diplomacy in contemporary international law, we will examine 
whether sanctions have any major impact on the said rights.
3 Kern Alexander, «Economic Sanctions», Law and Policy, Palgrave, 2009, p. 11. 
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II. TYPOLOGY OF SANCTIONS 
 The scope of sanctions employed against target states especially 
by the Security Council has varied from sanctions regime to another 
regime insofar as the Council has expanded or contracted the measures 
applied in order to induce or reward a target’s compliance. With the 
exception of regimes consisting of basic arms embargoes, no two 
sanctions regimes have been precisely the same.4 Sanctions regimes 
usually contain a blend of different types of sanctions. These can be 
broadly divided into the categories of economic and financial sanctions, 
4 For example in case of Iran see: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 
passed on 31 July 2006. Demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and re-
processing activities and threatened sanction; United Nations Security Council Res-
olution 1737 , passed on 23 December 2006 in response to the proliferation risks 
presented by the Iranian nuclear program and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing 
failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board 
of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 
(2006), Made mandatory for Iran to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities and cooperate with the IAEA, imposed sanctions banning the supply of 
nuclear-related materials and technology, and froze the assets of key individuals and 
companies related to the program; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 
; passed on 24 March 2007,Imposed an arms embargo and expanded the freeze on 
Iranian assets; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 , passed on 3 March 
2008; Extended the asset freezes and called upon states to monitor the activities of 
Iranian banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and to monitor the movement of in-
dividuals involved with the program through their territory; United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1835, Passed in 2008; United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1929 , passed on 9 June 2010. Banned Iran from participating in any activities 
related to ballistic missiles, tightened the arms embargo, travel bans on individuals 
involved with the program, froze the funds and assets of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and recommended that states 
inspect Iranian cargo, prohibit the servicing of Iranian vessels involved in prohibited 
activities, prevent the provision of financial services used for sensitive nuclear activi-
ties, closely watch Iranian individuals and entities when dealing with them, prohibit 
the opening of Iranian banks on their territory and prevent Iranian banks from entering 
into relationship with their banks if it might contribute to the nuclear program, and 
prevent financial institutions operating in their territory from opening offices and ac-
counts in Iran; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984 , passed on 9 June 
2011. This resolution extended the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the 
Iran Sanctions Committee for one year; United Nations Security Council Resolution 
2049, passed on 7 June 2012, renewed the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Committee’s 
Panel of Experts for 13 months.
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and non-economic sanctions.5And in order to maintain the scope of a 
particular sanctions regime at a particular time, it is important to take 
into account both the range of prohibitions directed against a target, 
as well as any exemptions provided from those prohibitions.6 In this 
research we have to be limited just to the notion of the sanctions 
generally and then we examine the case of Iran in special.
A. THE SCOPE AND THE ELEMENTS OF SANCTIONS
Although international sanctions are modern phenomena, scholars 
have uncovered evidence which suggests that the use of sanctions as 
an instrument of foreign policy dates back to antiquity.7 Some define 
sanctions as measures directed to political objectives, measures that 
consist of government-mandate limitations on customary trade or 
financial relations with the target country. 8
However in a large category there are four main methods of applying 
sanctions by the States or international organizations against targets: 
trade controls, suspension of aid or technical assistance, freezing of the 
target’s financial assets, and blacklisting of companies involved with 
bilateral business.9
First, trade controls (both goods and services) by the sender 
include one or more of the following elements: (1) on exports/imports; 
(2) restrictive exports/imports licensing; (3) limited or total export 
sanction (embargo); (4) limited or total import sanction (boycott); (5) 
discriminatory tariff policy (including denial of most favored nation 
status); (6) restriction or also cancellation of fishing rights; (7) suspension 
or cancellation of trade agreements; and (8) bans on strategic goods and 
5 Geoff Simons, "Imposing economic sanctions: legal remedy or genocidal tool?", 
Press, 1999, PP. 7-37. 
6 See Jeremy Matam Farrall, “United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law”, Cam-
bridge 2007, p.106. 
7 J. Cooper, «Sanctions and Economic Theory», South African Journal of Economics, 
53(3), pp.287-296. 
8 R. Carbaugh & wassink, «International Economic Sanctions and Economic Theo-
ry», Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economicbe e Commerciali 35: 217-225 cited 
in Brian Dollery, «Economic Sanctions and Economic Theory», policy, summer 1989, 
p. 53.
9 Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 14-5. 
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advanced technology exports.
Second, suspension of aid or technical aids by the sender includes 
one or more of the following elements: (1) reduction, suspension, or 
cancellation of credit facilities at concessionary or market rates; (2) 
reduction, suspension, or cancellation of technical assistance, military 
assistance, development assistance, and training programs; and (3) 
votes against loans, grants, subsidies, and funding for technical or other 
assistance from international organizations.
Third, freezing of the target’s financial assets by the sender includes 
one or more of the following elements: (1) freezing bank assets of the 
target government or target nationals; (2) expropriation of other target 
assets, including the target’s investment in the sender; (3) freezing 
interest or transfer payments; (4) refusal to refinance debt repayments 
toward (interest and principal); and (5) suspension or cancellation of 
joint projects.
Fourth, blacklisting of companies with bilateral business by the 
sender includes the following elements: (1) blacklisting of sender’s or 
third parties’ companies doing business with the target, including trade 
and investment; and/or (2) blacklisting of the target’s companies that is 
doing business with the sender, including trade and investment.10
However, in contemporary international law the scope and the 
elements of the sanctions have been actually evolved and this included 
many recent pressures and imposing new sanctions that should be 
considered in details.11
1. The Purposes and the objectives of the Sanctions
The object of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter by the Security Council, is the maintenance of international 
peace and security.12 The basis for UN sanctions under international law 
derives more specifically, from Article 41, which covers enforcement 
measures not involving the use of armed force. Article 41 in United 
10 The Anatomy  of Economic Sanctions,  p.98, available  at www3.nccu.edu.
tw/.../Chapter%203%20%20Anatomy%20of%20Econo, accessed on(11/9/2013)
11 However in this article we have to be confined just to the sanctions against Iran and 
those specially against the Iranian media.
12 For more details see http://www.un.org/sc/committees, accessed on (10/10/2013). 
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Nations charter doesn’t specifically mention the word “sanctions”, 
though it lists specific sanctions measures to be taken while at the same 
time making it clear that the list is not comprehensive:
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply 
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.”13
 The main theory is that pressure on the civilians of the targeted 
country will contribute into pressure on the government for change. The 
Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, observed that the objective 
of sanctions is to change in specific ways the behavior of a government 
or regime … and, in a conflict situation, to diminish the capacity of the 
protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight.”14
Pressing pain on the target is a means to an end and the end being 
a change of behavior on the part of a third player that is the state. If 
close allies of an autocratic leader see their fortunes endangered by 
erratic behavior, they might apply pressure to change his foreign policy. 
The problem is that he is a dynamic actor, too. As fast as the sender 
can impose pain, the leader can deliver analgesics in the form of new 
contracts, while buying his allies’ continued loyalty. If his economy is 
not growing, however, the autocrat cannot make the pain disappear. He 
can only impose it on others, exacerbating tensions between competing 
parts. 
Sanctions are a common tool for foreign policy and have been 
extensively employed by Western states to targeted sates in order to 
improve human rights conditions, adopting or maintaining democratic 
institutions, or respecting the rule of law within their borders, sanctions 
often fail to achieve these goals15. In addition to this, sanctions frequently 
13 Art. 41 of United Nations charter.
14 Secretary-General, Reviews Lessons learned during Sanctions Decade in remarks to 
International Peace Academy Seminar, April 17, 2000, Para. 3. 
15 See Hufbauer Gary C. Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly A. Elliott. 1990a. «Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy», 2nd edition. Washington, DC: 
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impose significant economic and social costs on civilians. They may 
also contribute to adverse changes in the domestic political climate and 
policy decisions of the target state.16
However, as we know improving human rights is often an explicit 
goal of economic sanctions, particularly those by Western states, 
the human rights impact of sanctions is an important issue of policy. 
Therefore it’s important to determine that whether sanctions improve 
the human rights practices in the target state or if they perhaps make 
an already problematic situation even worse. It’s important to examine 
whether the sanctions unintentionally or intentionally contribute to 
increase in repression or make worse the human rights conditions in 
targeted states. 
In this article after examining the sanctions of the European Union 
against Iran, we will take look at the violation of the freedom of mass 
media by a dual perspective: first human rights aspects and democracy. 
B.  EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
The Iran sanctions regimes by EU have developed in multilateral 
political, strategic, and also legal contexts that have applied increasing 
pressure on Iran over the last decade in response to that country’s 
nuclear program. 
The history resort to economic sanctions against Iran by the European 
countries shows that limits of the sanctions employed by member states 
of the European Union covered different aspects of mutual economic, 
political and cultural relations from export and import of goods, technical 
cooperation to some other restrictions on traveling and transportation 
fields as well. In comparison to those have been implied by the Security 
Council against Iran because of basic differences, it seems that a notable 
difference has been occurred among the others, Sanctions against 
importing Iran’s crude oil by countries including prohibition on buying 
Iran’s oil in any way; banning insurance coverage for tankers carrying 
the Iranian oil and financial resources related to Iran’s imports; banning 
investment in Iran’s petrochemical industry; enforcing sanctions against 
Institute for International Economics, cited inReed M. Wood, «Economic Sanctions 




the Central Bank of Iran within the European Union; prohibiting sales 
of metals to Iranian governmental institutions and the Central Bank of 
Iran; banning delivery of banknotes to Iran’s bank; prohibiting sales 
of all goods with dual use to Iran; and expanding the list of persons 
covered by sanctions compared to previous resolutions are as such 
notable examples of the restrictive measures of European union. 
The Treaty on European Union includes restrictive measures as one 
of the potential tools that could be maintained to follow the goals of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council imposes sanctions 
also when exerted by the Security Council of the United Nations and 
according to the terms of the Partnership Agreements and there are three 
internal important documents that are relevant for the EU’s restrictive 
measures policies.
 The first document is the ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions)’ (hereafter referred to as ‘Basic Principles’) 
approved in June 2004 by the Political and Security Committee to 
address a request by the Council to develop a policy framework. This 
principle states that Union should impose sanctions in accordance with 
the UN, but also autonomously whenever ‘necessary’.[‘Basic Principles 
on the Use of Restrictive Measures’, 2004]. This document is for the 
use of targeted sanctions, and the second and the third documents were 
adopted to maintain this objective. 
The second one is the ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation 
of Restrictive Measures (i.e. Sanctions) in the framework of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (i.e. Guidelines’) of 2003 
and updated in 2005, 2009 and also 2012, including definitions and 
some directives on how to design and implement restrictive measures, 
and also important information according to the different typologies 
of restrictions that can be imposed and on how to measure their 
effectiveness.
And finally, ‘The EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation 
of Restrictive Measures’ (‘the Best Practices’), of 2008 which includes 
the relevant information on identifying the correct designated entities, 
and on the administrative modalities for freezing assets, including the 
procedure on how to grant exceptions to the measures.
It’s good to mention that imposing sanctions is considered as a 
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foreign policy decision, therefore the EU can adopt them in order to 
maintain any of the goals of Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the TEU: for 
the improvement of ‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law as well.’ The ‘Basic Principles’ 
deals with this issue as well and states that EU restrictive measures 
should be adopted in supporting efforts to fight terrorism and to prevent 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to uphold respect 
for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. Those 
‘Guidelines’ as well contain various important elements, stating that ‘the 
restrictive measures do not have an economic motivation’. In specific 
terms, restrictive measures have been accepted to support democracy 
and human rights, to manage conflicts, to help democratic transitions, 
to counteract the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to 
combat with terrorism.17
The case of Iran indicates many problems that exist in measuring the 
effectiveness of sanctions: various senders, resilience of targets, conflict 
of interests among different important players (i.e. the US, China, the 
EU) and unsuitability of main goals between senders and targets. In this 
article, the decision of the EU to impose additional sanctions on top of 
those decided by the Security Council could seem unsuitable, but if one 
looks at the different players of the same game, including the audiences 
and how sanctions can effect on them, then the assessment may result 
in some interesting conclusions.
Iran made its plans unclear to enrich uranium and was accused by 
the international community of violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The response of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
international community was to convince Teheran to make its plans clear 
and to follow the principles glorified in the NPT that would allow Iran 
to process uranium for simply peaceful purposes. Despite several offers, 
such as building a nuclear power plant in Russian territory to replace 
the site in Bushehr, the United Nations imposed sanctions in December 
2006 when it became clear that Iran didn’t intend to cooperate with 
17 See Francesco Gumelli: «How EU Sanctions Works?» A Narrative, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, 2013, p.8-11.
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the IAEA. The Council of the European Union received the sanctions 
imposed by the UN such as travel ban, commodity boycotts and arms 
embargo but decided to interpret vastly the guidelines intended by 
Resolution no.1737 approved by the Security Council of United Nations 
and extended the freeze of assets and the travel ban to 23 new target 
countries. The EU mentioned list was related to the UN and extended 
several times in 2008 and 2009 to reach 79 targets with Council decision 
no.413 of June 2010.18
In addition the Council went beyond the UN ruling by extending 
the list of targets, by making a detailed list of technologies that were 
not intended to be sold to Iran because of the risk of them in using 
to support either the nuclear or the missile programs as well, and 
by imposing a number of financial restrictions on Iranian financial 
institutions and on oil and gas in 2012.19 Given the structure of the 
EU sanctions regime specially concentrating on certain specified parts, 
there isn’t an obvious need in the U.S. regime for express exemptions to 
support humanitarian trading. However an exception is found in the EU 
financial sector-related sanctions. For instance, Regulation 1263/2012 
exempts from the limitations on EU banks’ participation in transactions 
with Iranian financial institutions “transfers regarding healthcare, 
medical equipment, or for agricultural purposes,” in cases that they 
have undergone authorization procedures.20
Thus EU has indicated about 350 targets beyond those UN list, 
including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. Moreover, following the violent 
repression of the 2010/2011 protests in Iran, the Council decided to 
impose a freeze of assets and a travel ban as well and with Council 
decision 235 of 11 April 2011 on individuals responsible for the 
repression and a ban on trade of equipment that could have been used 
by the government to that goal. It’s good to note that October 2011 
listing indicated 59 individuals.21
18 See Council Decision 413 of 26 July 2010, 2010/413/CFSP.
19 See Council Decision 35 of 23 January 2012, 2012/35/CFSP.
20 See Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012 amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, [2012] OJ L 
356/34. 
21 See Council Implementing Decision 670 of 10 October 2011, 2011/670/CFSP].
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It’s obvious that over the time a legal intention has been replaced by 
some prejudices on behalf of the EU member States in case. While the 
government of Iran has insisted on the peaceful nature of its Nuclear 
Programs, the question is whether restrictive measures taken by the 
European Union against Iran has violated the right Iranian to mass 
media.
C. SANCTIONS AND VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF MASS 
MEDIA
1. Freedom of media and human rights
It’s important to note first that Sanctions could also lead to serious 
political consequences that were not originally intended by sender 
countries, such as worsening the level of human rights and democratic 
freedoms in the sanctioned countries.22 The first example of the preface 
to the universal declaration of human rights provides: ‘whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.’ The second sentence of the preface states 
‘…the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed 
as the highest aspirations of the common people.’ 
Article 1 of the universal declaration of human rights provides 
that: ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ The first sentence of article 2 
presents: ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social, 
property, birth or other status.’ The first sentence of article 7 states that 
‘all are equal before the law and are entitled without any distinction to 
equal protection of the law.’ 
In addition the Preamble to the UN International Covenant on 
22 Drury, AC and Li Y . U.S. “economic sanction threats against China: Failing to 
leverage better human rights”,Foreign Policy Analysis 2(4),2006, 307–24. 
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Civil and Political Rights23, which was adopted by the UN in 1966 
(came into force in 1976), approves that ‘recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’ and, consequently, that rights ‘derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person’. International recognition of the basic dignity, 
equality and autonomy of all people has affected on the formulation of 
fundamental rights, especially with respect to freedom of expression. 
Also International recognition of the basic dignity, equality and 
autonomy of all people has impacted strongly upon the formulation of 
fundamental rights, particularly with regard to freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression is seen as a basic human right and is protected 
internationally (as discussed later in this chapter) because the concepts 
of dignity, equality and individual development or fulfillment need that 
when human beings talk or otherwise express themselves, what they are 
expressing is a reflection of who they are, and thus worthy of respect 
and protection.
It is clear from the international human rights instruments that the 
right to freedom of expression requires not only that everyone is free 
to express but that they are free to do so in a range of different types 
of media, such as the print or broadcast media, related to licensing 
requirements in respect of the broadcast media. Indeed, one academic, 
Michael Bratton, has said: ‘in order to be politically active, citizens 
require means to communicate with one another and to debate the type 
of government they desire for themselves. Civic discourse can take 
place in various forums, the most important of which are the public 
communications media, both print and electronic’.24
However the right to freedom of expression hasn›t passed to serve 
the movements of the 1970s and early 1980s in favor of ‹right to 
communicate›. This movement was aimed to state the problem of small 
numbers of media products in a top-down manner by governments 
operating in days before direct citizen participation in decision-making 
had developed. It sought to find mechanisms to involve larger numbers 
23 http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/survey/CovenantCivPo.pdf, accessed on (5/9/2013).
24 Michael Bratton, «Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa». Institute for De-
velopment Research Reports, 11(6), 1994, p 2. Available at http://worlded.org/docs/
Publications/idr/ pdf/11-6.pdf, accessed on (14/12/2013).
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of people in the decision-making structures that governed by advocating 
for ‹the right to take part in public communication›. It aimed to balance 
the allocator and “repressive” communication that was aimed to prevail 
in mass media at the time. The right to communicate movement became 
linked with the debate within UNESCO on the New World Information 
and also Communication Order that served to balance the global flow of 
news again in favor of the disadvantaged South. Doomed to flounder on 
cold war controversies over whether this was in fact a hidden agenda for 
subverting freedom of expression for authoritarian goals, the movement 
came a generation too early, petering out before what some rightly refer 
to as the “great democratic triumph” brought by the internet.25
Thus it seems clear now that the right to communicate was misled 
in its strategy, however glorified its aims, the solution has come not 
from reform of the international human rights architecture but from 
technological developments which succeeded in doing what the ‹May 
1968 generation› had requested by opening the media space and creating 
opportunities for all, at least many in the developed world, to be owners 
of their own little press. 
2. Freedom of media and democracy
Foreign economic pressures as sanctions against countries and 
the growing exclusion of the target countries will potentially create 
new incentives for the political leadership to do state censorship and 
accordingly resort to media repression. 
 While we are focused on the concept of the ‘imposed’ sanctions, 
coercion will be unlikely to disturb the repressive capacity and 
legitimacy of the target political leadership, and hence will not 
promote more freedoms, including greater freedoms of association, 
speech, and communication, especially in less-democratic systems. It 
seems that on the contrary inter alia sanctions are likely to worsen the 
level of press freedom in the sanc tioned countries by (1) increasing 
governmental restrictions and repression against the media following 
25 Helen Darbishire, «Freedom of Expression, A Flexible and Open Right, the right to 
public expression», available at http://mediapolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/Freedom-
of-Expression-a-flexible-and-open-right.pdf, p.8., accessed on (2013/07/17) 
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the growing economic and political isolation of the target regimes and 
(2) reducing the economic viability and development of independent 
media outlets.26 So the issue is that the media repression by the 
government might be more common during international crises and 
employment of sanctions because limiting the exposure of the public 
to diverse news and controlling information is crucial for government 
to maintain public opinion and reserve the status quo.27 Many believe 
that the use of repressive measures against media helps the political 
leadership enhance the regime’s ideology and policies in controlling 
relations with the world outside. Thus it is true about the states with 
minimum levels of democracy or even nondemocratic States. These 
regimes may provide several methods for the media repression, such 
as applying strict state censorship over the coverage and publication 
of public information, calling off the licenses of reform, and limiting 
foreign broadcasts.28 In these conditions the sanctions may exacerbate 
the anarchical environment of the state and intensify the circumstances 
which may be clearly different with end objectives of the economic 
sanctions. 
Therefore sanctions will likely impose significant damages on 
media independence especially when the targeted countries are in a 
less democratic situation. In addition the vast groups of sanctions cause 
greater damages to press freedom than small numbers of sanctions. 
Because extensive sanctions pose a greater challenge for the sustainability 
of independent media opening, there will be more dependence on state 
subsidies and more concentrated media ownership, which results in 
reduced exposure of the public to diverse news and opinions. On the 
other hand multilateral sanctions lead to more deterioration of press 
freedom than unilateral sanctions. It is evident that multilateral sanctions 
significantly restrict the economic and political exchanges of the target 
state with the outside world, which allows the political leadership to 
have stricter control over flows of public information and the operations 
26 Dursun Peksen, «Coercive Diplomacy and Press Freedom: An Empirical Assess-
ment of the Impact of Economic Sanctions on Media Openness, international political 
science review», p.451, available at http://ips.sagepub.com/content/31/4/449.
27 See Gunther R and Mughan A, Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspec-
tive. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.70. 
28 Samii WA, Middle East Review of International Affairs 4(3), 1999, pp.1–11.
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of local and international media sources.29
Accordingly because of side damage to press free dom caused by 
sanctions, policymakers should also consider the negative outcomes 
caused by coercion as well as debating whether sanctions succeed 
in achieving their goals. This aspect of the case is of course in 
complementary with other human rights sides of the situation as the 
threats to right to medicine or food or right to a safe environment.
 
III.THE CASE OF IRAN
The sanction against Iranian media is an attempt by the West 
countries. It is on top of another notable breach of freedom of speech by 
satellite providers namely Eutelsat SA and Intelsat SA which stopped 
the broadcasting of several Iranian satellite channels in October 2012.
In November, the Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. 
(AsiaSat) in Hong Kong also took all Iranian channels off air in East 
Asia under pressure from the US.
In a similar way in December, Spain’s top satellite company Hispasat 
ordered its satellite provider over to take Iranian channels Press TV and 
Hispan TV off the air. 30 And all of these limits on Iranian media were 
maintained as an attempt to press Iranian media as a kind of political 
pressure in accordance with sanctions to force Iran to stop its nuclear 
energy programs as well.31
Thus while Europe’s largest satellite provider Eutelsat provides it 
29 Dursun Peksen, Coercive Diplomacy and Press Freedom, op.cit, p. 462. 
30 See http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/04/281682/us-imposes-sanction-on-
iranian-media/ accessed on (09/12/2013).
31 While some believe that these sanctions are because of some U.S pressers and rele-
vant to some recent decisions of the U.S Congress concerning the new set of sanctions 
against Iran. See for example New Executive Order Regarding Iran and Other Activi-
ties Related to U.S Sanctions against Iran, October 15, 2012. section 3 of the order au-
thorizes the blocking of property of persons determined to have engaged in censorship 
or other activities ,the date of Iran’s [disputed] presidential election, that(1) prohibit, 
limit or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran 
; or (2) limit access to print or broadcast media ( including the facilitation or support 
of international frequency manipulation by government of Iran or an entity owned or 
controlled by the government, that would jam or restrict an international signal). 
Shahbazi and Rezaei
95
has withdrawn the European broadcasting licenses for nine Iranian TV 
channels and ten radio stations deciding to improve the EU sanctions 
against Iran.
It’s good to note that the active authorities of the mentioned Medias 
have all condemned these attacks against Iranian as a part of war 
against freedom of speech. The attacks to Iranian mass media are the 
clear breach of 19th article in Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that highlights the human rights to express their ideas in a free and 
clear way. Also in the mentioned article: ‘everyone has the right of free 
expression and that right includes of not having any stress and fear 
according to those ideas and be free in maintaining information and 
thoughts and broadcasting them.’ 
Iran also has continuously provided that these breaches of the human 
right in freedom of speech and freedom of mass media are illegal. And 
also it threatened to sue the EU for what it needs compensation of 
damages, both material and spiritual.32
The EU has responded that the decision taken by Eutelsat is not 
part of the EU’s new sanctions agreed in Luxemburg on Monday. Maya 
Kochiyanchich, spokeswoman for the EU declared that ‘It is a decision 
taken by Eutelsat, the decision that the EU has taken note of and the 
EU has adopted indeed this week a new set of restrictive measures 
against Iran but they focus on finance, energy, trade and transport and 
not telecommunication.’33 
These misguided activities of satellite providers are also the 
extensive breaches of International Telecommunication Union laws 
and regulations. The basic rules of which are related to maintenance 
of cooperation with regard to the use of telecommunication on the 
international arena. ITU coordinates the shared use of the radio, 
promotes international cooperation in organizing satellite orbits, works 
32 Press TV, Iran’s English language news service and one of the channels banned re-
leased this statement. (“The reason given, that Eutelsat is following sanctions is a lie. 
There are no sanctions against Press TV or other news sources, no UN vote supports 
it and I would like to see the issue taken before the General Assembly.”)
33 Voice of Russia, “Iran Eutelsat Sanctions Violate Freedom of Speech,” http://
voiceofrussia.com/2012_10_17/Iran-Eutelsat-sanctions-violate-freedom-of speech/
accessed on (28/12/2013). 
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to develop telecommunication infrastructure in the developing world, 
and helps in the development and coordination of worldwide technical 
standards. The ITU is also active in areas including broad Internet, 
recent wireless technologies, maritime and aeronautical navigations, 
satellite-based meteorology, Internet access, data, TV broadcasting, 
and new generations of networks. The unlawful sanctions against Iran 
were exactly contrary to the main aims of ITU accordingly. It’s worthy 
of note that coordination among people in the world is facilitated 
through the use of global networks and without these people are likely 
to be disabled who couldn’t express freely and gather information from 
around the world and also use them.
It’s important to mention about the contracts made between Iran and 
the satellite providers in the west. These private companies haven’t had 
any attention to those contracts according to pacta sunt servanda, the basic 
principle of international law. In its most common sense, the principle 
refers to private contracts, highlighting that clauses are law between 
the parties and implies that nonfulfillment of respective obligations is 
a breach. With reference to international agreements, every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith and the only limit to pacta sunt servanda are jus cogens, 
the peremptory norms of general international law.
Although all the mentioned sanctions on mass media have been 
cleared and also two related sanctions of Intelsat and Utelsat satellites in 
the August of 2014 but unfortunately the effects of those grave breaches 
of regulations and clear breaches of Human Rights international 
principles wouldn’t let the countries round the world to change their 
attitudes toward the policies of western countries as well. 
While it seems obvious that sanctions against States are in conflict 
with many human rights basic norms like the freedom of mass media, 
the question remains that what is the actual difference between unilateral 
act of Eutelsat and unilateral economic sanctions of the EU by breaching 
of the mentioned rights of Iranians to freedom of mass media?34
34 However European satellite provider Eutelsat SA says it has stopped the broadcast 
of several Iranian satellite channels following an order by the European Commission, 
Press TV reports, see http://saebpress.com/2012/10/eu-bans-broadcast-of-iranian-tv 




1. Freedom of media is the freedom of expression and communication 
through the mass media including various electronic media and 
published materials. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, 
and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of 
frontiers.’ Therefore the relation between freedom of mass media and 
right to freedom of express and access to free flow of information 
isn’t deniable and reinforcing the latter may enforce the implication 
of the former.
 In this article we took a look at the violation of freedom of mass 
media which shows the need for deep analysis. The U.S and E.U 
sanctions obviously violate Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the universal 
declaration on human rights which are on freedom of thought and 
expression as the most important rights that especially Western 
countries highlight more on them. During the past few years in 
numerous cases Iranian TV channels have been removed from 
Satellites. This is expressly violation of freedom of mass media and 
access to free flow of information.
2. Generally the sanctions may make worse the level of freedom of 
press in the countries under the sanctions and the situation in less-
democratic States is poorer. However, Iran as a democratic State 
has condemned sanctions and has tried to provide a more proper 
environment for a mutual dialogue between states. In this situation, 
freedom of mass media and access to free flow of information will 
improve the relations between people around the world and may 
reinforce the establishment of the basic norms of human rights, 
accordingly. 
3. The contracts between Iran and some western satellite providers are 
between a state and some foreign companies. Therefore they are 
valid and the parties should respect the contents of the contracts 
such as the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda.
4. In accordance with principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs 
of the states35 and principle of cooperation among states36, violation 
35 http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/principles.shtml, accessed on( 8/12/2013)
36 See Articles 1(3), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/MultilateralConventions/
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of the obligations by satellite providers is considered as flagrant 
breach of their obligations and is obviously condemned indeed.
5. While fully recognizing the sovereign right of each State to regulate 
its telecommunication and having regard to the growing importance 
of telecommunication for the protection of peace and the economic 
and social development of all States, article 1 of the statute of 
the International Telecommunication Union request the States 
facilitate the peaceful relations, international cooperation among 
people and economic and social development by means of efficient 
telecommunication services. The acts of satellite providers against 
Iran could be the grave breach of the object and purpose of this 
organization. 
6. The issues remain are whether Iran could sue the satellite providers 
and their policy-makers in international or regional forums such as 
European Court of Justice37, European Court for Human Rights38 or 
the others? This needs to be scrutinized in future studies.
CharteroftheUnitedNations.pdf, accessed on (10/10/201). 
37 European Court of Justice is the highest court in the European Union in matters 
of European Union law. As a part of the Court of Justice of the European Union it 
is tasked with interpreting EU law and ensuring its equal application across all EU 
member states. For more about jurisdiction of the court see http://europa.eu/about-eu/
institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm, accessed on (6/9/2013). 
38 European Court for Human Rights is international court established by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. It hears applications on a case that a contracting 
state has breached one or more of the human rights provisions concerning civil and 
political rights in the Convention and its protocols. An application can be lodged by 
an individual, a group of individuals or one or more of the other contracting states and 
the Court can also issue advisory opinions. The Convention was adopted within the 
context of the Council of Europe, and all of its 47 member states are contracting par-
ties to the Convention, for information about its jurisdiction see more in http://www.
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